Whereas the bulk of the literature on DSGE models provides a rationale for in ‡ation targeting strategies, there is no model doing such a job for the strategy implemented for almost ten years now by the Eurosystem and known as the "two-pillar monetary policy strategy". We try to address this issue by developping a small "two-pillar" DSGE model for the euro area. In this paper: 1) we allow real balances to appear both in the IS and Phillips curves; 2) we …nd some evidence that money plays a non-trivial role in explaining the euro area business cycle; 3) this provides a rationale for the central bank (the European Central Bank) to factor in monetary developments, by exploiting the long-run relationship between money growth and in ‡ation, eventually accounting for structural shifts in velocity; 4) we found some evidence that the ECB has reacted systematically to a …ltered measure of money growth but not necessarily in a non-linear way, i.e. by di¤erentiating high money growth periods ("excess liquidity") from "normal" ones.
Introduction
The most distinctive feature of the European Central Bank's (ECB) monetary policy framework has become known as the two-pillar strategy for assessing risk to price stability. In this very speci…c framework, money is given an important role, which, since the inception of the ECB, has been signalled by the announcement of a reference value for the growth of a broad monetary aggregate (M3).
The two-pillar strategy was reviewed in May 2003. While con…rming the use of the two-pillar framework, the ECB's Governing Council also emphasized that the "monetary analysis" (the former "…rst pillar" of the strategy) will mainly serve as a mean of cross-checking, from a long-term perspective, the indication stemming from the "economic analysis" (the former "second pillar"). In addition, and to underscore the long-term nature of the reference value, the Governing Council decided to discontinue the practice of an annual review. In practise, the reference value has Banque de France -Research Department -Monetary Policy Research Unit Banque de France -Financial Stability Directorate -Directorate General Operations not been reviewed since the inception of the ECB (it has remained unchanged at 4.5% since December 1998). This decision was interpreted by most observers as a downgrading of the role of money. Does money still have an active role in the ECB's monetary policy strategy and how is it factored in in practise?
As far as the strategy is concerned, the role given to money acknowledges the fact that monetary growth and in ‡ation are closely related in the medium to long run. Indeed, empirical studies carried out at the euro area level seem to con…rm the monetarist statement according to which "in ‡ation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon" (Friedman, 1956 ). In a recent contribution, try to set out the need to announce a monetary growth reference value in the context of a two-pillar small backward-looking macroeconomic model. Their main point is that, contrary to the assumption usually made in New Keynesian frameworks, the central bank's in ‡uence over the nominal interest rate does not operate in the same way in the short term and in the long term. In the short term, the central bank can in ‡uence the nominal interest rate by increasing the quantity of money. This increases real balances and lowers the real interest rate and, consequently, the nominal interest rate through a liquidity e¤ect. The liquidity e¤ect however does not come into play in the medium to long run and, consequently, the central bank cannot in ‡uence the real interest rate. Its only means of action with regard to the nominal rate is to in ‡uence in ‡ation expectations.
This can be done through the announcement of a money supply growth target, which is derived in a way as to ensure the consistency between short-term and long-term in ‡ation expectations. In this context, the reference value helps to reduce long-term price level uncertainty and acts as an error-correction mechanism ensuring the trend stationarity of the price level. Similarly, in the context of inaccurate estimates or imperfect knowledge regarding un-observables such as the output gap, Woodford (2007) and Beck and Wieland (2007) both argue that the ECB's computation of excess liquidity (i.e. deviation of actual M3 from the reference value), the cross-checking and …nally the possibility to change interest rates in response to sustained deviations of long-run money growth are similar to the commitment to error-correction and therefore have some stabilisation properties.
In practice, money seems to play a crucial role in the setting of monetary policy in the euro area. As an illustration, the ECB's President, J. C. Trichet, recently declared: "I consider the monetary pillar has been probably decisive when we decided to increase rates in December 2005, against the advice of the OECD, the IMF, and a number By contrast, we allow, at least in the setup of our model, for an active role of money on output and in ‡ation.
Consequently, the central bank may react to monetary developments but not necessarily in a linear fashion, accounting for the fact that benign monetary developments should not necessarily trigger signi…cant changes in the policy rate. We also suppose that the European Central Bank tries to exploit the long-term relationship linking monetary developments and in ‡ation. Finally, in order to isolate and quantify the e¤ects of changes in real balances on output and in ‡ation but also to account for recent monetary developments in the euro area, our model involves that the measure of money must be adjusted for velocity shifts.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 of the paper presents the main features of our two-pillar DSGE model for the euro area. Section 3 provides some indications on the model resolution while section 4 deals with the estimation of the model on euro area data and comments the main results. Unlike Ireland (2004) and Andrés et al. (2006) , we estimate our model resorting to Bayesian techniques rather than by maximum likelihood methods. We do not impose any constraints on key parameters, in particular on the parameter measuring the e¤ect of real balances on output and in ‡ation. Indeed, both Ireland and Andrés et al. impose some constraints on that parameter, which in the end arti…cially bias the coe¢ cient toward zero and lead them to conclude that real balances have a limited, if any, role in explaining business cycle ‡uctuations. Section 5 draws some monetary policy implications and concludes.
2 A Two-Pillar DSGE monetary policy model for the euro area Our model elaborates on the seminal paper by Ireland (2004) , who develops a small structural model of the monetary policy business cycle. A key feature of this model is that it allows real balances to appear both in the IS and the Phillips curves. This direct e¤ect of money on output and in ‡ation provides us with a justi…cation to include a measure of money growth into the monetary policy rule. Relative to the model of Ireland, in the model used here, prices are set on a staggered basis as in Calvo (1983) rather than according to a quadratic cost of price adjustment à la Rotemberg (1982) . This is done so as to bring nominal rigidities into the model in a way that is consistent with and that provides micro-foundations to the two-pillar Phillips curve's representation proposed by Gerlach (2004) . 
Households
The representative household enters period t with money M t 1 and bonds B t 1 and receives from the monetary authority a lump sum nominal transfer T t . Next, bonds mature providing B t 1 additional units of money. The household uses some of this money to purchase B t new bonds at a nominal cost B t =r t where r t stands for the gross nominal interest rates between period t en period t + 1. 
The household then carries M t units of money into period t + 1, subject to the following budget constraint:
where m t = M t =P t denotes real balances, t = P t =P t 1 the in ‡ation rate and w t = W t =P t the real wage. The household chooses c t , h t , B t and m t to maximise the following expected utility function:
where the discount factor 2]0; 1[ and > 0. In this setup, which is directly borrowed from Ireland (2004), we assume that money yield utility and that money and consumption in the utility of the representative household may be non-separable. The latter assumption has the consequence that real balances may enter into the IS curve, i.e. opens up a channel through which money can a¤ect both output and in ‡ation.
The preference and money demand shocks, a t and e t , follow the autoregressive processes ln(a t ) = a ln(a t 1 ) + a;t ;
ln(e t =e) = e ln(e t 1 =e) + e;t ;
e;t N (0; e );
Letting t denote the nonnegative multiplier on (1), the …rst order conditions for this problem are:
where u 1 and u 2 are the derivatives of u with respect to the …rst and second variables. 
where > 1: The …nished goods-producing …rm chooses y t (i) for all i 2 [0; 1] to maximise its pro…ts, given by
, for all t=0,1,2,... The …rst order conditions for this problem are
which reveal that measures the constant price elasticity of demand for each intermediate good i 2 [0; 1]. As competition drives the …nished goods-producing …rm's pro…t to zero in equilibrium, P t is determined by
.
The representative intermediate goods-producing …rm
During each period, the representative intermediate goods-producing …rm hires h t (i) units of labour from the representative household to manufacture y t (i) units of intermediate good i according to the following production function:
where F is increasing and concave and z t is the aggregate productivity shock, which is assumed to follow the autoregressive process
where 1 > z > 0, z > 0. In equilibrium, this supply side disturbance acts as a shock to the Phillips curve.
The representative intermediate goods-producing …rm sells its output in a monopolistically competitive market and sets nominal prices on a staggered basis, as in Calvo (1983) . During each period, each …rm resets its price with probability 1 p , independently of the time elapsed since the last price adjustment. The remaining …rms, with probability p , set prices according to the following rule:
that is to say that a …rm that can not optimally adjust its prices sets it as a convex combination, T , of past in ‡ation and steady state in ‡ation . This framework implies that lagged in ‡ation will enter into the linearized Phillips curve.
Note that setting the in ‡ation persistence parameter, p , to zero would result in the standard Calvo model (i.e. a setup in which non-optimally adjusting …rms would simply change their prices at the pace of steady state in ‡ation).
Equation (13) can also be expressed as:
where
The …rms that do adjust their prices at date t do so to maximise the expected discounted value of current and future pro…ts. Pro…ts at some future date t + j are a¤ected by the choice of price at time t only if the …rm has not received another opportunity to adjust between t and t + j. The probability of this is given by
t denotes the price chosen at date t and y ? t;T (i) the production of good i at date T if the …rm has not reset its price since date t.
The …rm's pricing decision problem them involves picking P ? t to maximise
with respect to (10):
where t =P t in equation (16) measures the marginal utility value to the representative household of an additional euro in pro…ts received during period t and w t measures the real wage paid by the …rm.
For all t = 0; 1; 2; ::: the …rst-order conditions for this problem are:
i.e. :
where the mark-up rate is given by = 1 .
The European Central Bank
The aim of this section is to formalise a monetary policy rule featuring the ECB's two-pillar approach, as clari…ed in the context of the review of the monetary policy strategy carried out in May 2003. The main aspects that we try to encapsulate in our setup are:
-a role for money in the setting of euro area policy rates. The reason is twofold: …rst, as our model allows real balances to appear both in the IS and the Phillips curves, it may be optimal for the central bank to adjust key policy rates with respect to monetary developments; second, monetary analysis is one of the two pillars of the strategy. As such, it complements the information stemming from the economic analysis, usually summarized by both the in ‡ation and the production stabilisation objectives in standard versions of the Taylor rule;
-a medium to long-term orientation, as initially signalled by the announcement of a reference value for M3.
Indeed, the Governing Council of the ECB seeks to exploit the long-term relationship between monetary growth and in ‡ation, that is to say tries to see through the noise in monetary data to recover those underlying trends which are relevant for monetary policy decisions.
- In order to re ‡ect these di¤erent aspects of the two-pillar strategy, we …rst allow money growth to enter into a standard Taylor rule, in addition to the in ‡ation and production stabilisation objectives. However, we assume that the central bank, in contrast to the private sector -households in particular -focuses on a …ltered measure of money growth. As in Beck and Wieland (2007) , we assume that the central bank regularly tests whether …ltered money growth still hovers around its long-term average. More speci…cally, we suppose that the central bank computes the following inequality:
with long-run in ‡ation (see Marx, 2007 
where 1 1 and 1 2 are two dummy variables such that:
t < c ;t on average over the last N c periods, 1 1 =0 otherwise;
Therefore, the central bank seeks to distinguish between "normal" periods and in ‡ationary ones, the state of the economy depending upon monetary dynamics. In this setup, we expect that 2 > 1 0: Despite this state-contingent rule, the model has a unique, stationary solution. 1 As an illustration, …gure 1 in the appendix displays the corridor corresponding to the "normal" state, for a choice of ( c ; N c ) = (1:1; 5). According to this set of parameters, the euro area economy was during 59 periods out of 109 in the strong monetary growth state.
Equilibrium
In our model, c t = y t for all t. In absence of shocks, the economy converges to a steady state in which y t = y, t = , m t = m, r t = r,a t = a, e t = e and z t = z. The symmetric equilibrium can be log-linearized around the steady-state (y; ; r; m) to yield the following set of equations:
where r = ru 2 = (r 1)eu 1
and where u 1 = u 1 (c; m=e), u 2 = u 2 (c; m=e); u 11 = u 11 (c; m=e), u 12 = u 12 (c; m=e), and u 22 = u 22 (c; m=e).
Equation (23) represents a forward-looking IS curve. It allows changes in real balances to directly a¤ect the dynamics of output. All of the parameters, with the possible exception of ! 2 , ought to be nonnegative. The parameter ! 2 measures the e¤ect of real balances on aggregate output. It is sometimes used in the literature (cf. Ireland (2004) or Andrés et al. (2006)) to explicitly test for non-separability (! 2 6 = 0). ! 2 ultimately depends upon the properties of the utility function of the representative household, and more speci…cally on u 12 . It might be positive, in which case money and consumption are complements as it is assumed in the mainstream of the literature, or negative, meaning that the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing with respect to real balances.
2 Equation (24) is a forwardlooking Phillips curve that allows changes in real balances to also have an impact on the dynamics of in ‡ation when (23) and (24) can be written as functions of ( b m t b e t ). Equation (25) is a money demand function with income elasticity 1 and interest semi-elasticity 2 . Finally, equation (26) is the non-linear augmented Taylor rule, featuring the two-pillar monetary policy reaction function of the ECB.
Using (27) and (21), the model can …nally be written as:
As an example, we can think of the non separable utility function u(c; m) = . The condition ! 2 < 0 corresponds to a value 2 > 1, and a strong concavity of the utility function with respect to money.
Model resolution
In this section, we brie ‡y outline the methodology which is implemented to solve the model. We mimic Uhlig (1999) and we suppose that the log-linearized equilibrium relationship can be written as:
where the vectors X t and Z t are given by:
and where the matrices F , G t , H t 1 , R and S are the matrices collecting the coe¢ cients. 3 At this point, it should be noted that G t and H t 1 are time-dependent and respectively take two values g 1 , g 2 and h 1 , h 2 depending on the state of the economy in t and t 1.
In Barthélemy and Marx (2008), we study in details some theoretical aspects of equation (32) and we cannot develop them in this paper. We only give the main principles of our resolution. We adopt an approximation method and consider two separate models, one associated with the policy reaction coe¢ cient 1 (state 1, model 1) and the other with the policy reaction coe¢ cient 2 (state 2, model 2). Owing to Uhlig, we can compute the transition matrices p 1 ; q 1 ; l 1 , respectively p 2 ; q 2 ; l 2 , which correspond to the version of the model in state 1, respectively in state 2.
The solutions of model 1, and model 2 are then given by: 3 The matrices F , Gt and H t 1 are given by : F = The matrices R and S satisfy: R = 2 6 6 4 To solve the model described by equation (32), we assume that the transition matrices only depend on the state of the economy at time t and not on previous periods ; precisely, if the state at time t is 1, transition equation is given by (33), if the state at time t is 2, transition equation is given by (34), depending on past …ltered money growth. It should be noted that this approach di¤ers from a Markov-switching model, as the implicit probability of switching from one state to the other is endogenous in our setup. Contrary to the standard Markov-switching approach, which assumes a random jump between the di¤erent states, we feel that our setup better …ts the two-pillar framework of the ECB. 
Estimation

Data
In order to estimate the parameters of our DSGE model, we use data over the period 1980:2-2007:2 on four key macroeconomic variables: real GDP per capita, the growth of real money M3 per capita, CPI in ‡ation rate and the 3-month short-term nominal interest rate. These Data are extracted from the Euro Area Wide Model database (Fagan et al., 2001 ). We also use the labour force data to normalize output and money growth. We use Eurostat data and linear projection (for 2006-2007) to update the labour force data. All the data are linearly detrended before the estimation.
Methodology
In section 3, we have modelled our problem with the transition law of motion (33) or (34), depending on f t . Because of the introduction of a non-linear monetary policy reaction function, the Kalman Filter has to be adapted by including time-varying matrices for the update phases so as to compute the likelihood.
With the notations introduced in section 3, we de…ne t = X t Z t and rewrite the model in a convenient state-space form:
Note that the model is time-dependent unlike the one described by Hamilton (1994) . By adapting the computation, we get that the sample log likelihood equals to:
where n is the dimension of y, N the sample size, tjt 1 the best forecast of t at time t 1. What could appear as more complicated in our model is the time-dependence of transition matrices. However, the time-dependence is completely backward, so that the best prediction of t knowing state t 1 is the same that the benchmark model without any threshold. Thus, it is possible to compute recursively the chain of predicted values, tjt 1 , and the covariance of prediction errors, T tjt 1 .
The sample log-likelihood conjugated with the prior distributions of parameters provides us with the posterior kernel distribution of a set of parameters. We compute the posterior kernel thanks to a Random Walk Metropolis Hastings Algorithm. 4 We can approximate the log-marginal density of the data by the Laplace Approximation and use it to compare di¤erent models (Geweke, 1998) . Moreover, we can assess the ability of these di¤erent models to replicate euro area stylised facts by comparing the theoretical and empirical autocovariances. While the log-marginal density provides us a single value to rank alternative models, we can discuss the limits and the di¤erences between di¤erent models by comparing the autocovariances.
Assumptions and priors
In our benchmark estimation, four parameters are calibrated. The long-run nominal interest rate, r = 2 + 3 1
2
, and the long-term in ‡ation rate are calibrated to 1:018 and 1:009 corresponding to their average values on our sample.
This implies a discount factor, equal to 0:991. We …x the technology production function such that the labour income share in total output is of 60%, so that ! p = 0:43. Finally, we set the slope of the Phillips curve p = 0:05.
5
We directly estimate = 1=! 1 , as prior is easier to de…ne for this parameter.
As in Smets and Wouters (2003) , the standard errors of the innovations are assumed to follow inverse gamma distributions (see Table 2 ). We choose Beta distributions for shock persistence parameters with mean 0. 
Results
We …rst estimate four di¤erent versions of the model presented above: in version 1, we estimate the model by imposing The main results are presented in Table 1 in the appendix.
The …rst question we want to deal with relates to the relevance of monetary developments to explain euro area data. The log marginal posterior di¤erence between model 2 ( = 0 only) and model 1 (! 2 = 0 and = 0) is 18.9.
Therefore, to choose model 1 over model 2, we need a prior probability over model 1 1:6 10 8 (=exp(18.9)) times larger than our prior probability over model 2. This evidence supports the assumption that money matters for the business cycle in the euro area.
As regards the parameters of interest, the response of aggregate demand (! 1 = 1= ) to changes in the real rate However, this may re ‡ect the instability of money demand functions estimated on euro area data and evidenced over the last …ve years. can take either a positive or a negative sign. We leave open that possibility by assuming a ‡atter as possible prior distribution for ! 2 . A negative sign would imply that money acts as a substitute to consumption. In such a case, a rise in in ‡ation increases the nominal interest rate and leads to a decrease in money demand. As consumption and money are substitutes, consumption rises and leisure falls. Work e¤ort then rises and with it output. Such a …nding might …nally re ‡ect the double role of money as a means of transaction and as a store of value. A negative sign of ! 2 would imply that the store value e¤ect is dominant.
Concerning the impulse response functions, the response of in ‡ation to a money demand shock is negative. The reason is that the elasticity 3 of money to money demand shock is smaller than 1, so money adjusted from velocity shift is negative. Thus, the marginal propensity to consume increases implying the fall of real wage and …nally a We turn now to the monetary policy rule. As money seems to matter to understand the dynamic of euro area data and as the Eurosystem's monetary strategy rely on a monetary pillar, it may be optimal for the European Central
Bank to systematically take into account a measure of money growth in its reaction function. 7 In the version 3 of our model (see table 1 , column 6), we suppose a constant and systematic reaction to the …ltered money growth, f t 1 . We set the value of the smoothing parameter to 0.15. This implies that the half of a one-o¤ rise in actual money growth would disappear after 4.5-quarters. 8 The weight of money growth in the policy rule is estimated around a similar sample period. However, they suppose that the ECB reacts to actual money growth whereas we assume it reacts to the deviations of …ltered money growth to its long-term average.
The introduction of monetary growth into the Taylor rule has a sizeable impact on the key parameters of the rule. For instance, the weight of the in ‡ation decreases and becomes smaller than in Taylor-type rules without money. 7 see the pre-version of Beck and Wieland (2007) . Even though they integrate money as a proxy of expected in ‡ation, their result tends to prove that including money growth in Philipps Curve implies a monetary policy depending on money growth. 8 see Gerlach (2004) for more discussion about the value of .
The gain of adding money growth into monetary policy rule is clearly identi…ed by the log-marginal density. The log marginal likelihood di¤erence between model 3 and model 2 is 29.2. This result implies that we need a prior probability over model 2 4:8 10 12 times larger than our prior probability over model 3 in order to reject the fact that including money into the policy reaction function is relevant. This result is also con…rmed by the behaviour of the autocovariances (see …gure 4). In most cases, the theoretical autocovariances for 1 = 2 6 = 0 better …t the empirical ones than for = 0; in particular, the correlations of in ‡ation rate with the observable variables are more convincing.
The introduction of money into the policy rule a¤ects the impulse response functions of the model to the shocks, in particular to a money demand shock (see …gure 7). A velocity shock leads to a less than proportional increase in …ltered monetary growth f t , so that money adjusted for velocity shifts decreases. In the previous case, this implies a negative response of in ‡ation and a positive response of output. When money growth is accounted for by the central bank, the latter is more than compensated by the surge in the anticipated interest rate due to the inclusion of money growth in the Taylor rule. The overall impact on output is therefore negative too. Then, the central bank increases its nominal interest rate, since f t enters with a one-period lag into the Taylor-type rule, while both output and in ‡ation increase due to the mechanical decrease of money growth. For this shock, the response to money growth implies a higher volatility of both output and in ‡ation, and a higher standard quadratic loss for the central bank. However, such a higher volatility on both output and in ‡ation is not evidenced for other structural shocks.
Does the ECB react stronger to high monetary growth or put another way to "excess liquidity"? To answer this question, we estimate our model including a non-linear state-dependent monetary policy reaction function that factors in …ltered money growth. Although we assume the same priors for the both coe¢ cients, the mode of the posterior distribution indicates that 1 = 1:01 and 2 = 1:57 for the parameters ( c ; N c ) set to (1:1; 5). In the last two lines of Table 1 , the mean of the posterior distribution of 2 1 and the ratio of draws where 1 is higher than 2 are indicated. According to the posterior distribution, this di¤erence is positive for 99:94% of posterior draws (see Table 1 ). Besides, there is a di¤erence of 2:6 between the log-data density of this setup and the previous one without threshold, which shows that, for this choice of parameters ( c ; N c ), to chose model 3 over model 4, we need a prior probability over model 3 13:6 = exp(2:6) times larger than our prior probability over model 4. This would tend to show that, indeed, the European Central Bank tends to react more aggressively when money growth moves away from its long-term average. 9 The fact that 1 is strictly positive is consistent with the fact that money matters for the euro area economy. Though 1 is signi…cantly di¤erent from 2 , such di¤erence doesn't seem to matter a lot as far as the model simulations are concerned. This is illustrated by the panels displaying the autocovariance functions as well as the impulse response functions of the model (see …gures 5 and 8).
Conclusion
In this paper, we try to …nd a rationale for the "two-pillar" monetary policy strategy of the ECB by constructing a small DSGE model that allows real balances to play an active role in explaining the euro area business cycle. We …nd some evidence that money plays indeed a signi…cant role and enters in particular both in the IS and Phillips curves of our model. In such a context, it is optimal for the central bank to factor in monetary development into its monetary policy decisions. Taking money into account is a very challenging task as money and in ‡ation are not necessarily closely related in the short run as they are in the long run. Therefore, the central bank seeks to exploit such a long-term relationship and should disregard short-term ‡uctuations in money growth. This is the essence of the "reference value", the concept developed by the Eurosystem in order to identify "excess liquidity" periods, i.e.
risks to future price stability. Bearing this in mind, we suppose that the ECB sets its policy rate according to an augmented Taylor-type rule incorporating, beside the traditional in ‡ation and output gaps, a …ltered money growth gap. We suppose however that the reference value should account for structural shifts in the income velocity of money and for that reason compute it as the average money growth rate over a moving window of about …ve years.
We …nd some evidence that the ECB has reacted in a systematic way to monetary developments and weaker evidence that it has reacted in a non-linear way. One reason may be that, in practise, the reference value has remain unchanged since the inception of the ECB in a context where M3 growth has systematically exceeded the reference value. As a consequence, we only …nd slight support for the presence of shifts between two monetary policy regimes in the euro area. Another is that what we call money in our set-up might not correspond exactly to what is meant and measured by money in reality and by the ECB because of the absence of a banking sector in our model.
Our model also presents numerous drawbacks. In particular, it poorly replicates the euro area business cycle.
One reason, standard in this literature, is that it doesn't display enough persistence to the various shocks we identi…ed. 
